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 Non-technical summary
Whenever a defaultable entity enters into a nancial transaction, it sustains a cost of
carry to compensate counterparties for its potential inability to meet future contractual
obligations. The compensation mechanism for counterparty credit risk is captured by a
protection contract contingent to the default arrival time and to the exposure at default
(EAD). In the particular case of debt transactions, the cost of carry of the contingent
default protection liability is the cost of funds above the riskless rate. In the case of
derivative contracts, the cost of carry of default protection is either captured by a credit
valuation adjustment (CVA), or by the cost of posting collateral, or a combination thereof.
In the past two decades, nancial markets witnessed the implementation of dierent
standards for valuation of counterparty credit risk. The evolution of these standards was
driven by a desire to achieve a consistent valuation, an objective still not fully achieved
in Basel III regulatory documents and ISDA Master Agreements. The current standards
for bilateral credit valuation adjustments are also plagued by various paradoxes related to
own default risk (debit valuation adjustments, DVA) accounting which encourages anti-
economical behaviour by incentivising rms with poor credit policies and penalising rms
with good credit policies. Moreover, these paradoxes place an insurmountable limitation
to the ability of replicating dynamically the price process of derivative transactions, a
serious problem that hampers the role of banks as nancial intermediaries.
Our rst proposal regarding a logically and nancially consistent valuation framework
for CVA and DVA involves an inclusion of a rst-to-default clause in default protection
contracts. This modication however represents a substantial deviation from the unilat-
eral CVA (UCVA) specication in Basel III. To remedy in part, we introduce the new
notion of a portable CVA (PCVA) which is logically and nancially consistent and also
very close to the UCVA.
We next deviate from bilateral contracts and consider three counterparty credit risk
mitigation structures based on margin lending and full collateralisation. We conclude
that the quadri-partite structure is the most promising one, whereby two margin lenders
provide hypothecs to ensure full collateralisation at all times to cover the open mark-to-
market value of derivative transactions. These structures do not require a bank to carry
out CVA trading, and hence would eliminate a source of signicant market risk. Moreover,
conditional counterparty spread volatility risk is transferred to the counterparty. Pure
default risk is retained by the margin lenders that can securitise it in a straightforward
manner without being hampered by CVA volatility risk. We continue by introducing a
penta-partite structure which is a variation of the quadri-partite structure above with
the inclusion of a central counterparty. In the penta-partite case, we conclude that,
if a replication strategy between non-defaultable entities exists, then this strategy can
be implemented also by a defaultable structurer until its default time and the cost of
replication is the risk-free fair value, independently of the credit quality of the structurer.
We nish our paper with a short illumination of the case where nite liquidity is
included.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Immer dann, wenn ein ausfallgef ahrdetes Institut eine nanzielle Transaktion aus ubt,
muss es seinem Gesch aftspartner (Kontrahenten) Haltekosten zwecks Kompensation eines
zuk unftig m oglichen Risikos der Nichterf ullung der eigenen vertraglichen Verpichtungen
zahlen. Ein Ausgleich des Ausfallrisikos von Kontrahenten in mechanisierter Gestalt wird
in Form eines Schutzvertrags erm oglicht, der von dem Ausfallszeitpunkt des Kontrahen-
ten und der Forderungsh ohe ("Exposure at Default (EAD)\) abh angt. Im Spezialfall eines
klassischen Kreditgesch afts werden diese Haltekosten durch die Kosten der Finanzierung
oberhalb des risikolosen kurzfristigen Zinssatzes abgebildet. Bei Finanztransaktionen mit
Derivaten werden die Haltekosten zur Abdeckung eines m oglichen Ausfalls durch eine Kre-
ditbewertungsanpassung ("credit valuation adjustment (CVA)\) oder durch die Kosten
der Hinterlegung von Sicherheiten erfasst, beziehungsweise durch deren Verkn upfung.
In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten wurden unterschiedliche Ans atze zur Bewertung des
Kontrahentenausfallrisikos in den Finanzm arkten umgesetzt. Die Entwicklung dieser An-
s atze wurde von dem Wunsch angetrieben, eine global einheitliche Bewertung zu realisie-
ren; eine Zielsetzung, die weder durch die regulatorischen Basel III-Dokumente noch durch
die ISDA Master Agreements bewerkstelligt wurde. Das gegenw artige Richtma bez uglich
der bilateralen Kreditbewertungsanpassung wird zudem noch durch unterschiedliche Para-
doxien belastet, die sich im Zusammenhang mit dem eigenen Ausfallrisiko und einer damit
verbundenen Bilanzierung der "Schuldenbewertungsanpassung\ ("debit valuation adjust-
ment (DVA)\) ergeben. Dadurch wird ein anti- okonomisches Verhalten erzeugt, da aus-
fallbehaftete Institute durch DVA noch weiter ermutigt werden, risikobehaftete Gesch afte
zu betreiben und die nicht (oder nur schwach) ausfallgef ahrdeten Institute stark benach-
teiligt werden. Dar uber hinaus erzeugen diese Paradoxien eine un uberwindliche H urde
bez uglich einer dynamischen Replikation des Preisprozesses derivativer Finanzpositionen,
durch die die Rolle von Banken in Ihrer Aktion als Finanzintermedi are stark behindert,
wenn nicht sogar ganz verhindert wird.
Unser erster Vorschlag eines in sich logisch und auch nanzierungsm aig konsisten-
ten Rahmenwerks zur Bewertung von CVA und DVA bezieht eine "Erstausfallsklausel\
mit in die Ausfallschutzvertragsstruktur ein. Diese Modikation stellt jedoch eine signi-
kante Abweichung von der Spezizierung eines nur unilateralen CVA (UCVA) in Basel
III dar. Um diesen Sachverhalt teilweise zu mildern, stellen wir den neuen Begri der
portablen Kreditbewertungsanpassung ("portable CVA (PCVA)\) vor, der logisch und -
nanzierungsm aig konsistent ist und zudem eine hinreichend gute Approximation an das
UCVA darstellt.
Als N achstes weichen wir von bilateralen Vertr agen ab und betrachten drei weitere
kontrahentenausfallrisikomindernde Modelle, die auf der Bereitstellung eines Kredits von
Sicherheitsleistungen und vollst andiger Besicherung basieren. Wir werden dabei erkennen,
dass der vielversprechendste Vorschlag durch ein Vierparteiensystem gegeben wird; ein
Ansatz, bei dem zwei Teilnehmer Sicherheitsleistungen in Form von Hypotheken als Kredit
vergeben, um dadurch jederzeit eine vollst andige Besicherung von noch unbestimmten
Mark-to-Market-Werten derivativer Finanztransaktionen zu gew ahrleisten. Mittels dieses
Ansatzes w urde ein Finanzinstitut nicht mehr dazu verpichtet mit CVA zu handeln, so
dass dadurch ein signikanter Anteil des Marktrisikos verschwinden w urde. Zudem w urde
"bedingtes Kontrahentenspreadrisiko\ und das Volatilit atsrisiko auf den Kontrahenten ubertragen. Das reine Ausfallrisiko tragen die Kreditgeber der Sicherheitsleistungen, die
es auf einfache Art und Weise verbriefen k onnen, ohne dabei jedoch durch das CVA-
Volatilit atsrisiko behindert zu werden.
Im folgenden Schritt f uhren wir ein F unfparteiensystem ein - eine Variante des oberen
Ansatzes des Vierparteiensystems, bei dem ein zentraler Kontrahent als Clearingstelle
mit einbezogen wird. W urde im Falle des F unfparteiensystems ein replizierendes Portfolio
zwischen zwei nicht-ausfallgef ahrdeten Instituten existieren, so k onnte dieses replizieren-
de Portfolio auch durch ein ausfallgef ahrdetes Institut bis zu seinem Ausfallszeitpunkt
implementiert werden, wobei dann die Kosten der Replikation durch einen "fairen\, risi-
koneutralen Preis gegeben werden - unabh angig von der Bonit atsqualit at des implemen-
tierenden Instituts.
Zum Schluss unserer Arbeit beleuchten wir kurz denjenigen Fall, bei dem eine nur
begrenzt verf ugbare Liquidit at mit eingeschlossen wird.Restructuring Counterparty Credit Risk
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Abstract
We introduce an innovative theoretical framework for the valuation and replication
of derivative transactions between defaultable entities based on the principle of
arbitrage freedom. Our framework extends the traditional formulations based on
credit and debit valuation adjustments (CVA and DVA).
Depending on how the default contingency is accounted for, we list a total of ten
dierent structuring styles. These include bi-partite structures between a bank and
a counterparty, tri-partite structures with one margin lender in addition, quadri-
partite structures with two margin lenders and, most importantly, congurations
where all derivative transactions are cleared through a central counterparty (CCP).
We compare the various structuring styles under a number of criteria includ-
ing consistency from an accounting standpoint, counterparty risk hedgeability, nu-
merical complexity, transaction portability upon default, induced behaviour and
macro-economic impact of the implied wealth allocation.
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Whenever a defaultable entity enters into a nancial transaction, it sustains a cost of
carry to compensate counterparties for its potential inability to meet future contractual
obligations. The compensation mechanism for counterparty credit risk is captured by a
protection contract contingent to the default arrival time and to the exposure at default.
In the particular case of debt transactions, the cost of carry of the contingent default
protection liability is the cost of funds above the riskless rate. In the case of derivative
contracts, the cost of carry of default protection is either captured by a credit valuation
adjustment (CVA), or by the cost of posting collateral, or a combination thereof.
A number of dierent structuring styles for counterparty credit risk have so far been
proposed and several market standards have emerged. Nevertheless, renewed eorts to
arrive at a stable market standard are still under way, particularly as counterparty credit
risk management is an element of key importance to the nancial reforms enacted on the
wake of the 2007 banking crisis.
Traditionally, counterparty credit risk has been retained on banks' balance sheets along
with the risk implied by the CVA mark-to-market volatility. The CVA risk is transferred
internally within banks from business desks to CVA desks by transacting a Contingent
Credit Default Swap (CCDS). A CCDS oers (to the protection buyer) protection against
default of a reference entity, the nominal being given by the valuation of a reference
portfolio at time of default. The valuation of the CVA for derivative books is described in
Albanese, Bellaj, Gimonet, and Pietronero (2011) while individual CCDS contracts are
analysed in Brigo and Pallavicini (2008).
An open market for CCDS contracts never established itself. The Financial Times
reported, back in 2008 in Cookson (2008), that
Rudimentary and idiosyncratic versions of these so-called contingent credit
default swaps (CCDS) have existed for ve years, but they have been rarely
traded due to high costs, low liquidity and limited scope.
As a consequence, counterparty credit risk has traditionally been managed with bilateral
structures, whereby two parties agree to bear each other counterparty credit risk, being
remunerated each by a price adjustment.
In intuitive terms, if both parties B and C (say a bank and a corporate) have a relevant
default probability, the following happens. B, having a choice, would trade the relevant
portfolio with a default-free counterparty rather than with C. Therefore, in order to
trade with default risky C, B requires a reduction in the price of the trade from C to be
compensated for the additional default risk of C. This reduction is the credit valuation
adjustment (CVA(B;C)) B measures on C. However, seen from the point of view of C,
this is an increase in the price C has to pay to enter the trade, because of C's own default
risk. Hence from C's point of view this is a debit valuation adjustment, or DVA(C;B),
that increases the price of the trade.
On the other hand, B may default too. Hence, C will require a discount in price as
well, the CVA(C;B) seen by C on B. This second CVA, when seen by B's point of view,
will be a DVA(B;C) increase in price to be paid to C, making the price higher to B
itself. We will see that CVA(B;C) = DVA(C;B) and CVA(C;B) = DVA(B;C). This is
claried later on in the paper. Overall, when B computes the price of the trade, B will
1add to the trade price
DVA(B;C)   CVA(B;C) = CVA(C;B)   CVA(B;C):
When C computes the price of the trade, C will add
DVA(C;B)   CVA(C;B) = CVA(B;C)   CVA(C;B)
which is the opposite of the adjustment added by B. In this sense there is agreement on
the price.
This is equivalent to a contractual exchange of mutual default protection without the
intervention of third parties, remunerated at each other CVA. However, as we discuss in
this paper, the move towards central counterparty clearing (CCP) in OTC markets opens
new venues for counterparty credit risk transfer through multi-party arrangements.
1.1 From unilateral CVA and CCDS to bilateral CVA
Prior to 2007, counterparty credit risk was accounted for in terms of the so called unilateral
CVA (or UCVA), a valuation methodology which stems from the modeling premise that
the party carrying out the valuation is default free, when it typically is not. See for
example Brigo and Masetti (2005) for the general framework under netting, and Brigo
and Pallavicini (2007), Brigo and Bakkar (2009), Brigo and Chourdakis (2009), Brigo,
Morini, and Tarenghi (2011) for applications of this framework to various asset classes.
Clearly if both parties are defaultable and each pretends to be default free in doing the
calculation, each will try to have a reduction in price equal to the CVA. B will ask for a
reduction equal to CVA(B;C), whereas C will ask for a reduction equal to CVA(C;B).
What they should do is agree to have an adjustment (possibly positive or negative) equal
to CVA(B;C) CVA(C;B) and the opposite from C. This would be a bilateral valuation
adjustment on which the two parties would agree and where, as in a swap, the total value
of the trade to B is the opposite of the total value of the trade to C.
The unilateral adjustment UCVA is faulty as the valuation is asymmetric between the
two parties and breaks the basic accounting principle according to which a liability for
one party (such as default protection sold to the counterparty) represents an asset for the
counterparty itself. Only monetary authorities are in a position to evade this accounting
principle, which we refer to as money conservation. Accounting standards such as FAS 156
and 157 remedied the inconsistency by prescribing that banks have to mark a unilateral
debit valuation adjustment (UDVA) which is equal in amount to the unilateral CVA
balance sheet entry realised by the counterparty but sits on the opposite side of the
double entry ledger (cf. equation (2.1)). The CVA and DVA thus give contributions of
opposite signs to the portfolio net asset value (NAV).
This reects \money conservation" and applies to all forms of CVA including unilateral
CVA and the other variants described below such as rst-to-default CVA and portable
CVA. In the unilateral case, the combination
BCVA := UCVA   UDVA (1.1)
denes the so called bilateral CVA, see for instance Picoult (2005). The omission of the
UDVA term is justied only when one of the two parties in the trade can be considered
2as being default-free, an assumption that was easily granted to a number of nancial
institutions prior to 2007.
While restoring money conservation, accounting for the DVA introduced another valu-
ation inconsistency as close-out conditions ignored the UDVA and the loss of UDVA upon
counterparty default was not properly priced and accounted for. Indeed, if prior to the
default of say C, B used to mark to market its trade with C by adding its DVA(B;C),
now that C has gone, the liquidators of C will ask B to pay the mark to market of the
trade without B's DVA(B;C) = CVA(C;B), so that the value of the trade to B since
pre-default days has decreased exactly by B's unilateral DVA(B;C). To lessen the im-
pact of the inconsistency, in 2009 the ISDA modied the wording of the close-out rule in
the Credit Support Annex (CSA) portion of master swap agreements, see ISDA (ISDA).
Under the new rule, the unilateral DVA (which is the UCVA for the other side) is recov-
erable through the liquidation process on the same footing and with the same seniority
and recovery rate of the mark-to-market valuation of the underlying transaction. Since
the UDVA is not recoverable entirely but only in part, this modication roughly halves
the impact of the mispricing and accounting inconsistency, without however eliminating
it entirely.
In this paper, we consider a number of alternative contractual specications which
instead are fully consistent from an accounting viewpoint and correctly price the possible
loss of a fraction of DVA.
1.2 First-to-default CVA and First-to-default DVA
The rst consistent structures introduced historically are bilateral versions of the CVA and
DVA which include a rst-to-default contingency clause and are denoted with FTDCVA
and FTDDVA. According to this clause, upon defaulting an entity is relieved of all the
liabilities resulting from the default protection contracts it sold derivative counterparties
on their own default risk. The rst-to-default clause appears in Due and Huang (1996),
Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) and was made explicit in Brigo and Capponi (2008) in
the case of an underlying CDS. See also Brigo and Morini (2011) and Brigo and Morini
(2010). It was considered in the case of interest rate portfolios in Brigo, Pallavicini, and
Papatheodorou (2011) and also appears in Gregory (2009). In this context, the paper
Brigo, Capponi, Pallavicini, and Papatheodorou (2011) extends the bilateral theory to
collateralisation and re-hypothecation and Brigo, Capponi, and Pallavicini (2011) shows
cases of extreme contagion where even continuous collateralisation does not eliminate
counterparty risk.
The rst-to-default CVA is consistent from an accounting standpoint. However, this
denition does not come without shortcomings. One problem is that, if the credit of
the computing party is low, the FTDCVA can be substantially lower than the UCVA.
At default, the rst-to-default CVA even vanishes. These material discrepancies between
the rst-to-default CVA and the unilateral CVA contemplated in the Basel III accord
have undesirable side eects, such as for instance giving a competitive advantage to those
nancial institutions which are the slowest at endorsing the banking reform. In Watt
(2011), we read
"I would say the top 10 banks in the market are all aware of this, are discussing
it between themselves and are making the appropriate pricing changes", says
3Christophe Coutte, global co-head of ow xed income and currencies at
Soci et e G en erale Corporate and Investment Banking (SG CIB) in London.
"However, there are many smaller, regional banks that are not fully charg-
ing for the extra CVA capital in derivatives transactions. As we've prudently
stepped up our prices, the tier-two and tier-three rms have lled the gap
we've left. They weren't competing before because they couldn't oer enough
liquidity or the tightest bid-oer spreads, but now they can."
A second problem is that the rst-to-default CVA is unhedgeable since, to hedge it,
a bank would have to short its own credit, an impossible trade. This aggravates the
already serious problem of unhedgeability of the unilateral DVA term as it appears in the
denition of the BCVA. A bank who is foreseeing a dramatic increase in its own credit
quality may fear that DVA will decrease dramatically. We have seen that the typical
DVA gains in the market have been of the order of magnitude of billions, see for example
Brigo (2011). Hence banks try to prepare for the opposite moves by trying to hedge DVA,
and they tend to do that by proxying, see again Brigo (2011) and Brigo, Morini, and
Pallavicini (2013) for the details and references.
Finally, if the rst-to-default CVA is used for pricing while the unilateral CVA is
used to determine capital requirements, the material mismatch between the two makes
it dicult to optimise risk management strategies. Furthermore, if a bank charges the
FTDCVA to clients but then has to provision a higher amount given by the UCVA, the
dierence needs to be provisioned either by separate fundraising or from Tier 1 capital.
1.3 Basel III
The Basel III accord prescribes that banks should compute unilateral CVA by assuming
independence of exposure and default. The advanced framework allows banks to imple-
ment the eect of wrong way risk (i.e., the risk that occurs when the bank's exposure
to its counterparty is adversely correlated with the credit quality of that counterparty)
in the calculation of their exposures by using own models, while under the standardised
approach the Basel III accord accounts for the eect by means of a one-size-ts-all mul-
tiplier. Examples in Brigo and Pallavicini (2007), Brigo and Bakkar (2009), Brigo and
Chourdakis (2009), Brigo et al. (2011) indicate that the actual multiplier (the so called
\alpha" multiplier) is quite sensitive to model calibration and market conditions and that
the advanced framework is more risk sensitive.
Interestingly, the Basel III accord chooses to ignore the UDVA in the calculation for
capital adequacy requirements. Although consideration of the UDVA needs to be included
for accounting consistency, no such principle exists as far as capital requirements are
concerned.
1.4 Portable CVA
Due to the variety of possible dierent denitions of CVA (unilateral CVA, bilateral CVA,
rst-to-default CVA) combined with boundary conditions such as risk free or replacement
closeouts and the option to use either exact or approximate treatment of wrong way risk,
there appears to be material discrepancies in CVA valuation across nancial institutions.
This was pointed out recently in the article Watt (2011). The most signicant discrepancy
4is between UCVA and FTDCVA. Both are used in the industry for valuation, while only
the former is endorsed for regulatory purposes in Basel III.
In this paper, we introduce consistent structures called portable CVA and DVA (or
PCVA and, respectively, PDVA), dened so that, upon counterparty default, the PDVA
reduces exactly to the unilateral DVA by denition. These structures have not been
discussed previously in the literature and are introduced here because we nd them in-
teresting from the point of view of facilitating novations in case of a default of clearing
members clearing their OTC trades through a CCP.
Looking at the point of view of B for example, portable CVA is obtained when party B
marks to market the position by subtracting from its fair value calculation the discounted
value of the DVA of C that B would be liable to pay upon defaulting, in case B defaults
prior to C. This is a denition that places portable CVA right in between unilateral CVA
and rst to default CVA. It addresses the inconsistencies of UCVA in a less dramatic way
than full-edged FTDCVA. This is rather subtle to appreciate and Section 5 provides the
details.
From a quantitative standpoint, the dierence between UCVA and PCVA is minimal.
The portable CVA assessed by an entity converges to the unilateral CVA whenever the
credit-worthiness of the entity is perfect. Portable CVA and portable DVA are bilateral
structures in that they are contingent on the credit process of both parties. They are also
more conservative than the unilateral structures in the sense that PCVA  UCVA.
As we discuss in Section 5, an approximate upper bound for the dierence between
the portable CVA and the unilateral CVA is given by the product between UDVA and the
probability of default. Unlike the situation in the case of the FTDCVA, this dierence is
nearly immaterial in most circumstances.
1.5 CVA VaR and periodic resets
The CVA, i.e., the price of default protection contracts exchanged by parties in unsecured
derivative transactions, needs to be marked-to-market on a daily basis and is thus volatile.
The management of CVA volatility risk is crucial to mitigate the CVA VaR capital
charge. A proposal is to trade long dated swaps with an embedded obligation for both
parties to restructure the trade to equilibrium periodically while exchanging a payment
to settle the mark-to-market dierence at the reset date. However, this sort of modied
swap is not economically equivalent to the original long-dated swaps.
A not very practical but conceptually interesting alternative is to structure CVA and
DVA so that they are reset periodically to equilibrium leading to a oating rate variant
of CVA and DVA. As a simple example, let's consider the case of a bilateral transaction
between the default-free bank B and the defaultable counterparty C. Instead of charging
CVA upfront at the start date for the entire maturity of the transaction, the bank may
require a CVA payment at the start date for protection over the rst 6 months period.
After 6 months, the bank would require a CVA payment for protection for a further six
months period and so on, up to the nal maturity of the trade.
The benet of having periodic resets would be that this would mitigate the volatility of
the CVA by forcing it periodically to equilibrium. However, the diculty in implementing
such a structure is that xing the CVA premium in future semi-annual protection windows
would be subject to model risk and could be the cause of legally unresolvable controversy
5Figure 1: General quadri-lateral scheme including as special cases bilateral arrangements
(just B and C), tri-lateral arrangements (such as A, B and C) and quadri-lateral arrange-
ments with all four. The margin lenders A and D post collateral.
between the two parties. Although there is no regulatory framework surrounding this case
yet, there is also no precedent (to our knowledge) of bilateral contracts with contingent
xings which are inuenced by one of the two parties' discretionary decisions regarding
modeling choices.
A more robust implementation of the oating rate CVA paradigm from the viewpoint
of nancial stability and mitigation of systemic risk involves having third parties intervene
competitively in the valuation process. The oating rate structures in the next subsection
includes the case of full collateralisation and gives examples of such solutions where xings
are controlled by oer and demand.
1.6 Full collateralisation and margin lending
New classes of structuring styles emerge whenever one introduces the notion of full collat-
eralisation and margin lending, see also Albanese, Pietronero, and White (2011), Albanese
and Pietronero (2011) and Albanese, D'Ippoliti, and Pietronero (Albanese et al.). Full
collateralisation is known to be a very eective remedy to reduce counterparty risk. Be-
cause of the existence of gap risk and to counteract the volatility of mark-to-market
valuations, one actually requires haircuts and overcollateralisation schemes to reduce the
risk to almost nil, see again Brigo et al. (2011).
The incentive towards full collateralisation is built into the regulatory framework it-
self. The recent article Watt (2011) reports that uncollateralised trades are expected to
consume up to four times more capital under Basel III. The same article reports of the
case of Lufthansa, saying
"The airline's Cologne-based head of nance, Roland Kern, expects its earn-
ings to become more volatile - not because of unpredictable passenger numbers,
interest rates or jet fuel prices, but because it does not post collateral in its
derivatives transactions."
6Traditionally, the CVA is typically charged by the structuring bank B either on an
upfront basis or by the sake of being built into the structure as a xed coupon stream.
Margin lending instead is predicated on the notion of oating rate CVA payments with
periodic resets and is designed in such a way to transfer the credit spread volatility risk
and the mark-to-market volatility risk from the bank to the counterparties. We may
explain this more in detail by looking at Figure 1.
Collateral is most eectively allocated by margin lenders not by transfering the own-
ership of qualifying collateral assets, but in the form of hypothecs on qualifying collateral.
A hypothec is a contract written on underlying assets that transfers neither the ownership
nor the possession of the assets, but simply a lien contingent to specic default events
occurring.
The counterparty C is concerned about the amount of collateral she may have to
post periodically in order to trade derivatives with bank B. To avoid posting collateral,
C enters into a margin lending transaction. C pays periodically (say semi-annually) a
oating rate CVA to the margin lender A (`premium' arrow connecting C to A). In turn,
the margin lender A distributes the premium to investors according to a seniority hierarchy
(`premium' arrow connecting A to the investors). In exchange for this premium, the
investors provide the margin lender A with transferable hypothecs to qualifying collateral
assets over a six-months period (`collateral' arrow connecting the investors to A). In turn,
A passes the hypothecs to a custodian (`collateral' arrow connecting A to the custodian)
to meet collateral calls from the counterparty B. If C defaults within the semi-annual
period, B has a claim to the hypothec posted at the custodian and A apportions the
loss to its investors in increasing order of seniority, e.g. rst to the equity investor, then
to the mezzanine, then to the senior, then to the super-senior, etc. In this fashion, A
provides protection to B on its derivative exposure with respect to C (`protection' arrow
connecting the custodian to B) and the default risk is transferred to the investors of the
margin lender on whose collateral the hypothecs had been written.
At the end of the six months period, the protection contract needs to be renewed, thus
forcing a reset to an updated premium that keeps the structure at equilibrium. At the
end of the period, the margin lender has no residual obligation and may decide whether to
bid for a renewal or abstain from it. In turn, C may opt to renew the protection contract
with the same margin lender or another or even to syndicate the required coverage across
a number of margin lenders. Thanks to the periodic resets, the counterparty C is bearing
the CVA volatility risk, whereas B is not exposed to it. This is in stark contrast to the
situation which could happen in the case of traditional upfront or xed rate CVA charges.
The various structuring styles that can be devised for margin lending are predicated
on the separation between default risk on one side, market risk and spread volatility risk
on the other. As a consequence, these structures are in general multi-lateral. A tri-lateral
structure involves only one margin lender and only one party that posts full collateral.
In a quadri-lateral structure, collateral posting obligations are symmetric and there are
two lenders, one for the buy-side party and one for the sell-side party. The margin lender
for the sell-side party takes up concentrated bank risk and is likely to be distinct from
the margin lender specialised in non-banks. Structuring can also be penta-lateral in case
there is a central counterparty (CCP) that stands as a universal counterparty to both
sides. The presence of a CCP favors the novation process but still requires a market
infrastructure to facilitate margin lending. From a contractual viewpoint, multi-party
7structures still consist of a series of two-party contracts, hence there are no complexities
associated to multi-party legal agreements.
In this paper, we rst consider three examples of structures with margin lending: a
quadri-lateral one with daily resets, a quadri-lateral one with periodic resets over longer
time intervals and a tri-lateral one also with periodic resets. All these structures are
consistent from an accounting standpoint and the principle of arbitrage freedom.
Being based on oating CVA payments that reset periodically and are proportional to
the counterparty's conditional credit spreads and open exposure, quadri-lateral structures
remedy the unhedgeability issue that plague all the various forms of bilateral CVA by ef-
fectively ensuring that CVA volatility risk is absorbed by the party that is responsible for
generating it. Default risk instead is passed on to the investors who nance the margin
lenders. We suggest this structuring style gives rise to a more resilient market infras-
tructure than the traditional one based on bilateral long-term CVA and DVA structures
which are left to the bank to hedge. If in addition CCPs are present, the eectiveness
of margin lending benets of the greater degree of netting which reduce the carry cost of
derivative replication strategies, see Figure 2.
1.7 Macro-economic impact
The traditional CVA and DVA bilateral structures are based on the mutual exchange
of long-term default protection contracts. This eectively embeds credit exposures in
each and every derivative transaction. Given the size of global derivative markets, the
embedded credit optionality eectively transfers wealth on a global scale with a substantial
macro-economic impact.
All participants in derivative markets, by transacting interest rate swaps or FX op-
tions or any other derivative, credit-linked or not, have acquired automatically credit
protection on themselves and sold credit protection on their counterparties. This implies
that whenever an entity's credit worsens, it receives a subsidy from its counterparties in
the form of a DVA credit protection asset which can be monetised by the entity's bond
holders upon their own default. In fact, the acquired protection on itself by the defaulted
entity mitigates the carry cost of derivative positions and ultimately does not drain cash
as rapidly as would happen otherwise as the entity approaches default. Whenever an
entity's credit improves instead, it is eectively taxed as its DVA depreciates. Wealth is
thus transfered from the equity holders of successful companies to the bond holders of
failing ones, the transfer being mediated by banks acting as nancial intermediaries and
implementing the traditional CVA/DVA mechanics.
Rewarding failing rms with a cash subsidy may be a practice of debatable merit as
it skews competition. But rewarding failing rms with a DVA asset is without question
suboptimal from an economic standpoint: the DVA asset they receive is paid in cash
from their counterparties. However, it cannot be invested and can only be monetised by
bond holders upon default. The portion that is not monetised by bond holders, ends up
sitting as a CVA reserve on banks' balance sheets. Either way, these capitals are largely
sterilised.
Margin lending structures reverse the macro-economic vicious circles engendered by
CVA/
DVA mechanics by eectively eliminating long term counterparty credit risk insurance and
8avoiding the wealth transfer that benets the bond holders of defaulted entities. This has
several eects: (i) it accelerates the default of failing rms by extracting cash payments
proportional to their credit spread and the fair value of the positive derivative exposure,
(ii) it reduces recovery rates without damaging derivative counterparties but only bond
holders of the defaulted entities, (iii) it gives an incentive to failing rms to orderly unwind
their derivative position as they approach default, (iv) it reduces the carrying costs for
derivatives trades to those more successful rms whose spreads tighten and gives them a
competitive advantage by strengthening their ability to hedge.
The impact of monetary and government policy in times of crisis is also radically
dierent. Prior to the crisis, banks used to set aside a CVA reserve which is just the
expected level of loss due to counterparty credit risk. Losses in excess of the CVA were
not budgeted for and fell back to the banks' treasury departments. When the crisis
arrived, the rms whose credit deteriorated had DVA claims that overwhelmed banks
and forced governments to intervene with major cash injections. These funds selectively
beneted failing rms whose DVA gains were the highest. High quality names with
relatively tighter credit spreads instead did not draw any benet. The government policy
of providing subsidies in terms of DVA nancing perhaps inadvertently favoured only the
bond holders of defaulted entities who monetised the subsidy at the time of recovery.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this policy did not prove to be a particularly ecient allocation
of resources and was unable to help reverting the economic recessionary phase.
The Basel III accord improves on the pre-crisis situation by allowing for CVA VaR
charges which eectively raise the bar for capital adequacy and strengthen provisioning
strategies. More importantly, the Basel III accord also oers the alternative of full col-
lateralisation which solves the problem of counterparty credit risk at the root (except in
cases of extreme contagion), thus eliminating the anti-economical DVA subsidies to the
bond holders of bankrupt rms. However, full collateralisation raises the spectrum of
heightened liquidity risk unless a robust and extensive market infrastructure for margin
lending is established.
Assuming an infrastructure for margin lending extensive enough to cover the entire
scope of derivative markets, a systemic nancial crisis could still be caused by a mismatch
between oer and demand in the hypothecs market. This would happen if margin lenders
cannot provision sucient hypothec capital buers from investors to lend to participants
in derivative markets so that they can meet their collateral posting obligations in full. The
existence of a fully developed market infrastructure for margin lending would help averting
a systemic crisis by providing a new tool for monetary authorities to inject liquidity
temporarily in the form of short-term, super-senior hypothec nancing to margin lenders.
This sort of intervention would still be an exceptional occurrence, but would arguably be
less intrusive from a macro-economic standpoint than quantitative easing and the heavy
injection of government funding into the banking system. While a crisis could be mitigated
by granting super-senior hypothecs, it would still lead to a widening of credit spreads and
extract wealth from failing rms in the form of insurance premia, thus accelerating or
even triggering defaults and ultimately reducing recovery rates on defaulted debt, to the
detriment of debt holders.
We foresee margin lenders in OTC markets to be nancial intermediaries negotiating
hypothecs. While on the asset side there are insurance wraps on netting sets created
through full collateralisation by hypothecs to qualifying collateral, on the liability side on
9Figure 2: Multi-party scheme involving a central counterparty.
the balance sheet of margin lenders there are investors providing transferable hypothecs to
qualifying collateral of which they retain ownership. The hypothec notes issued by margin
lenders will arguably be ranked by seniority and be similar to a securitisation structure
intermediate between a cash and synthetic CDO. Similarly to synthetic CDOs, hypothec
tranche payments do not include riskless interest rates but are only based on credit spreads
as the benecial owners of the assets underlying hypothecs are receiving interest payments
independently. However, similarly to a cash CDO, hypothecs are fully collateralised and
unlevered. Unlike both traditional synthetic and cash CDOs, we envisage hypothecs to be
short term instruments with maturities of about 6 months as their objective is to ensure
that CVA volatility risk is not transferred as with standard CVA/DVA structuring, but
rests with the originating counterparty.
The CDO market played a trigger role in the crisis started in 2007 in part because
of the inadequate, over-simplistic and non-rigorous local valuation methodologies such as
the one-factor Gaussian copula model which did not take advantage of modern comput-
ing technologies, see for instance Brigo, Pallavicini, and Torresetti (2010). The insistence
on bilateral CVA structuring with the consequent large scale wealth transfer and anti-
economical misallocations are similarly not due to a conscious policy decision. Instead,
they derive from the use of inadequate and simplistic methodologies that are not techno-
logically current and only allow the valuation of linear risk metrics which are indierent to
credit-credit correlations across counterparties such as the traditional forms of CVA. Mov-
ing toward margin lending will thus require a wave of renewal and a realignment between
mathematical modeling and computing technologies along with rigorous and consistent
global valuation methodologies.
1.8 Organisation of the paper
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains denitions and axioms that ac-
ceptable counterparty credit risk structures need to satisfy. Section 3 reviews the three
historical standards for counterparty credit risk that dominated in the periods prior to
2007, between 2007 and 2009 and post 2009. All three standards are inconsistent from
the accounting and valuation standpoint. As we explain, inconsistencies have gradually
been recognised and reduced through time but were not entirely eliminated. In Section
104, we discuss the rst-to-default CVA, the rst fully consistent structure that has been
proposed. In Section 5, we introduce two alternative forms of portable CVA. In Section 6,
we discuss collateralised transactions based on a market infrastructure for margin lending.
Each of the Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 includes a comparison in terms of consistency from
an accounting and valuation standpoint, hedgeability, numerical complexity, portability
upon default, induced behaviour and macro-economic impact. In Section 7, we discuss
dynamic replication and in Section 8 we consider the case of nite liquidity. Section 10
concludes.
Finally, we would like to point out that this is not meant to be a fully rigorous
mathematical paper. We believe the mathematics to be sound but we have not formalised
it fully as our objective is to provide an informal introduction. We will formalise the
framework in full technical and rigorous detail in future work.
2 Denitions and axioms
For the probabilistic setup and our use of arbitrage freedom we refer to the appendix.
Consider two defaultable entities B and C, exchanging stochastic cash ows from time
0 and up to the future nal time T. Let B and C be the stopping times for default of
B and C respectively. Also, let Rt(B) and Rt(C) be the recovery rates in case B and C
default at time t, respectively. Finally, let rt be the risk-free rate and let's agree to work
under the risk neutral measure for pricing.
According to the Fundamental Theorem of Finance (cf. e.g. de Finetti (1931), Del-
baen and Schachermayer (1994), Harrison and Pliska (1981)) there is no arbitrage if and
only if all market transactions between any pair of non-defaultable entities, i.e., entities
where B = C = 1 with probability one, are valued as the discounted expectation of
future cash ows under a globally dened valuation measure. Therefore, in the default-
free case, we denote the related fair value to B by Mt(B) =  Mt(C). We assume this
fair value has been obtained through the risk neutral valuation formula as an expectation
of future discounted cash ows under one and the same globally calibrated measure used
across all instruments (cf. e.g. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002), Denition 8.1.2.). We also
assume that there is a nal maturity T < 1 such that no cash ows occur after time T,
i.e., Mt(B) = Mt(C) = 0 8t > T
The process rt is the short-term interest rate and is assumed to be adapted to the
market ltration at time t. Similarly, Et denotes expectation conditional on the same
ltration1.
Let Vt(B) and Vt(C) denote the fair values to parties B and C respectively of the trans-
action. Defaultable transactions are not directly covered by the Fundamental Theorem
since the life of a valuation agent is limited by its own default arrival time.
In Brigo (2005) the case of the CDS options market model is analysed, where equiv-
alence of measures is restored through a complicated approach based on a restricted l-
tration which takes out the default singularity when taking expectations, see also Morini
and Brigo (2011) for the multi-name version of the same technique.
We can nevertheless avoid such technicalities and reduce the problem of fair valu-
ation to the Fundamental Theorem by decomposing a defaultable transaction in terms
1Mathematical modeling of ltration and processes will be made explicit in a subsequent paper.
11of an economically equivalent portfolio of hypothetical transactions exchanged between
two hypothetical non-defaultable entities and which explicitly includes default protection
contracts on B and C. This is similar, in the bilateral case, to B and C buying protec-
tion through contingent CDS from default-free parties to perfectly hedge the respective
unilateral CVA's with respect to C and B.
Denition 2.1 In case at least one of the two parties B or C is defaultable and there are
no collateral posting provisions ensuring a 100% safe level of overcollateralisation, i.e., if
the recovery rate on the fair value of a derivative transaction is not one by construction,
then the transaction is called uncollateralised. If B and C are obligated to post full
collateral as a guarantee through a margin lender with a safe buer of overcollateralisation
that is safe with probability 1, the transaction is collateralised. We use this extreme
notion of collateralisation to simplify exposition but the assumption can be relaxed.
If only two parties B and C are involved and they exchange protection with each other,
the transaction is called bilateral. If in addition C buys protection on its own default
from a margin lender A while still B buys protection on its own default from C, the
transaction is tri-lateral. If B buys protection from a margin lender D and C buys
protection from a margin lender A, the transaction is quadri-lateral. Finally, if there
is a central counterparty (CCP) that stands as the counterparty to all trades as in Figure
2, the transaction is penta-lateral.
Remark 2.2 In a traditional bilateral transaction one may be used to CVA and DVA
terms being calculated in a standard way. Such terms are equivalent to the positions
mentioned above in the following sense.
The CVA term B charges to C is given by the loss given default fraction of the residual
exposure measured by B at default of the counterparty C if such exposure is positive. This
is the loss faced by B upon default of C. If C does not pay such loss to B, this is like
saying that B is condoning such loss to C, or in other terms B is selling protection to
C on the traded portfolio contingent on C's own default. This would be like B oering
a contingent CDS to C, oering protection against default of C to C and referencing
the traded portfolio between B and C. A similar analogy holds for the DVA term and C
selling protection to B against B's own default.
We now move to analyse more in detail the axioms that CVA and DVA price processes
should satisfy. In the following we are not referring to a particular formulation of CVA
or DVA, unless explicitly mentioned. We are rather writing down the requirements that
any sensible denition of CVA and DVA should satisfy.
2.1 Uncollateralised bilateral transactions
If the transaction is bilateral and uncollateralised, then party B sells to party C default
protection on C contingent to an amount specied by a close-out rule. Vice versa on
the default of B, party C sells protection to B on the default of C.
In formulas:
Vt(B) = Mt(B)   CVAt(B;C) + DVAt(B;C);
Vt(C) = Mt(C)   CVAt(C;B) + DVAt(C;B); (2.1)
12where
 Mt(B) is the mark to market to B in case both B and C are default-free;
 CVAt(B;C) is the value of default protection that B sells to C contingent on the
default of C, as assessed by B at t.
 DVAt(B;C) is the value of default protection that C sells to B contingent on the
default of B, as assessed by B at t.
 Similar denitions extend in case we exchange B and C, i.e. B $ C.
The above two valuation formulas reect the decomposition of the trade as a sum of
a riskless derivative transaction and reciprocal default protection contracts. For all the
specic denitions of CVA or DVA that we examine below, we require that the valuation
is decomposed as in the both equations (2.1).
It will occasionally be helpful to write (2.1) exactly at a default time. For instance, in
the scenarios where B < C, we write
DVAB(C;B)   CVAB(C;B) = VB(C)   MB(C) (2.2)
In order for the valuation of an uncollateralised, bilateral transaction to be fully consis-
tent, the axioms (A1), (B1) below must be valid along with one of the close-out conditions
below, either (C1) or (C2):
(A1) Discounted martingale condition until default: The process CVAt(B;C) is dened
for all t  B ^ C and satises the equation
CVAt(B;C) = Et
h
e
 
R B^C
t rsdsCVAB^C(B;C)
i
: (2.3)
(B1) Money conservation until default:
CVAt(B;C) = DVAt(C;B); (2.4)
DVAt(B;C) = CVAt(C;B); (2.5)
for all t  B ^ C.
(C1) Risk-free close-out rule: If B < C, then
VB(C) =  (MB(C))
  + RB(B)(MB(C))
+ = MB(C)   (1   RB(B))(MB(C))
+ :
(2.6)
Here a+ := maxfa;0g, a  := a+   a = ( a)+ for all reals a. VB(C) is interpreted
as the value to C of the transaction at the time when B defaults. Consequently, due
to (2.2) we can recast (2.6) as follows:
CVAB(C;B) = (1   RB(B))(MB(C))
+ + DVAB(C;B): (2.7)
Similar conditions with B $ C also hold.
13(C2) Replacement close-out rule: If B < C, then
VB(C) =  (MB(C) + DV AB(C;B))
  + RB(B)(MB(C) + DVAB(C;B))
+:
(2.8)
= MB(C) + DV AB(C;B)   (1   RB(B))(MB(C) + DV AB(C;B))
+ :
Equivalently (due to (2.2)) we have that
CVAB(C;B) = (1   RB(B))(MB(C) + DV AB(C;B))
+: (2.9)
Similar conditions with B $ C also hold.
In condition (C2), notice that the amount (1 RB(B))(MB(C)+DVAB(C;B))+ can
be interpreted as the novation cost, i.e., the loss amount to C deriving from the default
of B and assuming that the same derivative transaction is novated with a default-free
counterparty at time B. A similar nancially motivated interpretation is not available
in the case of a risk-free close-out as in (C1) as this rule does not reect correctly the
novation cost to the surviving party.
2.2 Collateralised quadri-lateral transactions with high frequency
resets
Collateralised transactions are best interpreted as transactions which reset periodically
in time whereby C buys default insurance from a margin lender A and B buys default
insurance from a margin lender D. See Figure 1.
The case of high frequency time resets on short periods t is mathematically the
simplest, although not quite realistic as very frequent credit spread resets would imply
major liquidity risk. We assume here that there is no jump in the risk free valuation M
of the contract when default happens. This is not the case for Credit Default Swaps as
underlying instruments under a variety of models, see for example Brigo et al. (2011). In
our case, though, we assume there are no jumps and there is no instantaneous contagion
and as a consequence the contractual structures are designed in such a way to periodically
reset valuations with (equidistant) period t > 0 at the following equilibrium levels
(i = 0;1;:::;n = T
tg):
Vit(A) = 0 (2.10)
Vit(B) = Mit(B); (2.11)
Vit(C) = Mit(C); (2.12)
Vit(D) = 0: (2.13)
To achieve this objective the margin lender A secures in a segregated custodian account
a sucient amount of collateral to guarantee that the amount (Mt(C))  is paid to B in
case C defaults at t, thus osetting the counterparty credit risk that C would otherwise
pose to B. In return, C pays to A a stream of premia payments t(A;C) with period
t. Symmetrically, B pays a cash ow stream t(D;B) to D so to ensure that C is
immunised from the risk of default of B.
In the case of this structure, the arbitrage free valuation axiom reads as follows:
14Figure 3: tri-lateral scheme whereby the counterparty C posts collateral to the bank B
by borrowing the collateral from the margin lender A.
(A2) Discounted martingale condition until default:
Et[Vt(A) + 1t<C<t+t(1   RC(C))(MC(C))
  + t(A;C)] = 0; (2.14)
Et[Vt(D) + 1t<B<t+t(1   RB(B))(MC(B))
  + t(D;B)] = 0: (2.15)
for all t < B ^ C. Here, Vt(A)  Vt+t(A)   Vt(A) and we neglect discounting
as is legitimate in the asymptotic limit t ! 0.
2.3 Collateralised tri-lateral transactions with periodic resets
The tri-lateral case is described in Fig. 3 and correponds to a situation where the coun-
terparty C has the obligation to post collateral in full to the bank B, while the bank B
does not have a similar obligation.
If resets are periodic and occur at times Ti;i = 0;1;2;:::;n, the fair value of the
position to the margin lenders is zero only at the reset dates Ti. However, the margin
lender A sells default protection to C, a contract whose value is CVAt(A;C). Similarly,
D sells default protection to B.
Vt(A) = e
R t
Ti
rsdsTi(A;C)   CVAt(A;C); (2.16)
Vt(B) = Mt(B) + DVAt(B;C); (2.17)
Vt(C) = Mt(C)   CVAt(C;B) + DVAt(C;A); (2.18)
(2.19)
(A3) Discounted martingale conditions until default: For all t 2 [Ti;Ti+1], the CVA terms
satisfy the equation
CVAt(A;C) = Et[e
 
R C
t rsds1C<B1C<Ti+1(1   RC(C))(MC(C))
 ]; 8t < C
(2.20)
CVAt(C;B) = Et[e
 
R B
t rsds(1   RB(B))(MB(B))
 ]; 8t < B (2.21)
15and the premium received by A from C is computed so that
Ti(A;C) = CVATi(A;C); (2.22)
(B1) Money conservation until default:
CVAt(A;C) = DVAt(C;A); (2.23)
CVAt(C;B) = DVAt(B;C); (2.24)
for all t < B ^ C,
2.4 Collateralised quadri-lateral and penta-lateral transactions
with periodic resets
The quadri-lateral case is described in Figure 1 and correponds to a situation where both,
the counterparty C and the bank B have a contractual obligation to post collateral in full
to each other.
In the case of periodic resets at times Ti;i = 0;1;2;:::;n, the fair value of the position
to the margin lenders is zero only at the reset dates Ti. However, the margin lender A sells
default protection to C, a contract whose value is CVAt(A;C) at t. In return, A obtains
from C premium payments Ti(A;C) at times Ti;i = 0;1;:::;n. Similarly, D sells default
protection to B and receives periodic premium payments Ti(D;B) at Ti;i = 0;1;:::;n.
Assuming t 2 [Ti;Ti+1],
Vt(A) = e
R t
Ti
rsdsTi(A;C)   CVAt(A;C); (2.25)
Vt(B) = Mt(B) + DVAt(B;D); (2.26)
Vt(C) = Mt(C) + DVAt(C;A); (2.27)
Vt(D) = e
R t
Ti
rsdsTi(D;B)   CVAt(D;B) (2.28)
(A4) Discounted martingale conditions until default: For all t 2 [Ti;Ti+1] the CVA terms
satisfy the equation
CVAt(A;C) = Et[e
 
R C
t rsds1C<B1C<Ti+1(1   RC(C))(MC(C))
 ]; 8t < C
(2.29)
CVAt(D;B) = Et[e
 
R B
t rsds1B<C1B<Ti+1(1   RB(B))(MB(B))
 ]; 8t < B
(2.30)
and the premia are computed so that
Ti(A;C) = CVATi(A;C); (2.31)
Ti(D;B) = CVATi(D;B) (2.32)
(B2) Money conservation until default:
CVAt(A;C) = DVAt(C;A); (2.33)
CVAt(D;B) = DVAt(B;D); (2.34)
for all t < B ^ C.
16The penta-lateral case where a CCP provides a clearing service is described in Fig.
2. If the CCP accepts segregated collateral posted at custodian accounts for variation
margin this case is economically equivalent to the quadri-lateral case above. In case the
CCP insists on receiving variation margin in cash instead (as is the case for instance
with the LCH) then one requires an additional intermediary that provides a collateral
transformation service, i.e., issues a revolving line of credit backed by the segregated
collateral.
3 Inconsistent structures for uncollateralised trans-
actions
Prior to FAS 156-157, standard structuring of counterparty credit revolved around incon-
sistent formulas that did not satisfy the conditions in the previous section. The standard
was to consider the unilateral CVA dened as follows:
UCVAt(B;C) = Et
h
e
 
R C
t rsds(MC(C))
 (1   RC(C))
i
; 8t < C (3.1)
while the UDVA term was set to zero. In this case, the discounted martingale condition
(A1) is satised by construction. The risk-free close-out rule (C1) is also satised since,
in case B < C, we have that
UCVAB(C;B) = (1   RB(B))(MB(C))
+ (3.2)
and UDVAB(C;B) = 0. By the same token, also condition (C2) is trivially satised as
the UDVA is zero. However, the money conservation condition (B1) is not satised in
this case.
After FAS 156-157, the standard changed to include the UDVA, i.e.
UDVAt(B;C) = UCVAt(C;B) (3.3)
and accordingly B $ C. This modied denition satises condition (B1) but compromises
the validity of (C1) and (C2) as the DVA term is now non-zero.
Notice that the close-out condition (C1) fails because of a mismatch equal to
UDVAB(C;B) between the right hand sides of equation (3.2) and equation (2.7).
In 2009, the ISDA introduced the replacement close-out condition in (C2) with the
intent to replace the risk-free close-out condition (C1) that prevailed until then, thus
reducing the mismatch to
(1   RB(B))
 
(MB(C) + UDVAB(C;B))
+   (MB(C))
+
: (3.4)
Notice however that this mismatch is still non-zero and the accounting inconsistency was
not entirely eliminated: the impact of the loss of DVA upon default was reduced by a
factor equal to the loss-given-default 1 RB(B), but still this loss was not properly valued
and accounted for.
Besides all being plagued by one inconsistency or another, these three heritage struc-
tures have the following characteristics:
(i) Hedgeability:
17{ The UDVA terms are problematic as hedging their variation would involve a
party selling protection on itself, an impossible feat. The practice of hedging
by proxying, namely selling protection on a name that is strongly correlated,
can partly reduce spread risk but exacerbates jump to default risk and systemic
risk. Indeed, if the name on which protection is sold actually defaults, the seller
who was hedging her DVA needs to make the protection payment, and this
could push the seller herself into a worse credit situation and closer to default.
For example, back in 2008, a hypothetical top investment bank that had been
highly correlated with Lehman Brothers and who had decided to hedge her
DVA by selling protection on Lehman would have been in deep troubles. For
informal comments on DVA hedging see for example Brigo (2011).
{ The UCVA variability instead can in principle be hedged, assuming the ability
to accurately value sensitivities and to assess gap risk. For an example on the
assessment of the pricing component of gap risk see for example Brigo et al.
(2011).
(ii) Numerical complexity: Valuing the UCVA involves modeling only one credit dynam-
ically along with all market factors aecting the derivative portfolio. The UCVA is
not sensitive to credit correlations, unless the underlying portfolio contains credit
instruments. In particular, UCVA is not sensitive to default correlation between B
and C. However, the UCVA is sensitive to credit-market correlations.
(iii) Portability: The structures with replacement close-out are relatively more portable
than the structures with risk-free close-out. However, since there is a mismatch in
condition (C2) and the loss of UDVA is not correctly priced and hedged dynami-
cally, a novation transaction in case of default involves a net unhedged loss for the
surviving party.
(iv) Induced behaviour: As the credit of one party deteriorates, its UDVA raises and the
party can realise a gain. On the other hand, as the credit of one party improves,
its UDVA lowers and the party needs to realise a balance sheet loss. This eect
rewards credit degradation and is an incentive on banks not to have a top credit
rating as achieving a high rating would force to realise accounting losses.
(v) Macro economic impact: The forced mutual sale of default protection embedded in
all derivative transactions, implicit in the CVA and DVA practices, is a mechanism
to transfer wealth from the equity holders of protable companies with good credit
to the bond holders of companies with bad credit. This is a consequence of the
earlier point (iv).
(vi) Bank capitalisation: Substantial bank capital needs to be allocated to UCVA re-
serves. In absence of collateral capital also needs to be allocated to compensate for
UCVA volatility which is reected in the UCVA VaR capital charge in Basel III.
Finally, there is a third charge against default risk due to the presence of substantial
gap risk and hedging ineciencies, as we hinted at above.
By denition, the UCVA is the expected loss due to defaults and the loss distribution
is highly skewed and very fat tailed. Hence, a UCVA provisioning strategy gives
18risk to systematic small gains for the UCVA desk and occasional large losses which
are apportioned unexpectedly to banks' treasury departments.
4 First-to-default CVA
First-to-default clauses appear in Due and Huang (1996), Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002)
and are made explicit for CVA and DVA calculations in Brigo and Capponi (2008), Brigo
et al. (2011), Brigo et al. (2011), Brigo et al. (2011), Brigo and Morini (2011), see also
Gregory (2009).
In the rst-to-default bilateral structure, the CVA and DVA are dened as follows:
FTDCVAt(B;C) = FTDDVAt(C;B) = Et
h
1C<Be
 
R C
t rsds(MC(C))
 (1   RC(C))
i
(4.1)
for all t < C, and B $ C. If B < C we have that FTDCVAB(B;C) = FTDDVAB(C;B) =
0. Hence, conditions (C1) and (C2) are actually equivalent in this case and they are both
satised. (To avoid confusion this claim is not in contradiction with what is stated in
Brigo and Morini (2011): in Brigo and Morini (2011), the rst-to-default bilateral CVA
is shown to be inconsistent under a replacement closeout rule which is dierent from the
rule we consider in this paper, in that the payout is expressed in terms of unilateral DVA).
The FTDCVA structure is consistent from a valuation standpoint. Other characteris-
tics include the following:
(i) Hedgeability: Unlike the unilateral CVA in the previous section, the rst-to-default
CVA of one entity is sensitive to the entity's own distance to default and decreases
with this distance tending to zero in the limit where the entity itself defaults.
Since the FTDCVA is typically much larger than the FTDDVA of a bank, the
non-hedgeability issue is potentially highly problematic, more so than the already
worrisome unhedgeability of the UDVA in the unilateral case.
(ii) Numerical complexity: The FTDCVA is sensitive to credit correlations between B
and C as these have an impact on the rst-to-default clause. Hence a fully correlated
credit-market simulation is necessary.
(iii) Portability: The structures are less portable than in the unilateral case with replace-
ment close-out rules as the rst-to-default DVA is null in case the default of one
of the two entities occurs. Hence, a novation against a non-defaulted counterparty
entails a loss equal to the DVA of the surviving entity.
(iv) Induced behaviour: As the credit of one party deteriorates and approaches default
while the credit of the counterparty stays stable its FTDCVA goes to zero but not
its FTDDVA. Hence, the valuation of a derivative transaction raises and ends up
above the risk free level. In particular, entities approaching default benet from
entering derivative transactions.
(v) Macro economic impact: The wealth transfer from the equity holders of successful
companies to the bond holders of defaulted entities is more pronounced than in the
19standard inconsistent structures in the previous section because of the wrong-sign
sensitivity of the FTDCVA to the credit of the assessing entity.
(vi) Bank capitalisation: Currently, the Basel III accord insists on using the unilateral
CVA as a metric to determine capital requirements. The possibly large discrepancy
between the rst-to-default CVA and the unilateral CVA is problematic when the
former is used for valuation purposes as it generates conicting priorities for risk
management. Moreover, the FTDCVA collected from clients is not sucient to
provision UCVA capital.
In a hypothetical scenario where the regulators were to endorse the FTDCVA for
regulatory purposes, banks with higher credit worthiness would be forced to allocate
more capital than banks with lower credit worthiness and would be less competitive.
In the limit of a bank approaching default capital allocation requirements would
tend to nil. Finally, as one goes through the credit cycle bank reserve requirements
would be anti-cyclical, i.e., lower during recessionary periods in a higher credit
spread environment and higher otherwise.
5 Portable CVA
The unilateral process UCVA(B;C) does not provide a consistent denition of CVA as it
does not take into account the closeout conditions under neither (C1) nor (C2). A way to
avoid this inconsistency is to resort to full edged bilateral CVA, i.e., the rst-to-default
CVA we have seen earlier. However, we may also eliminate the inconsistency with a less
dramatic change than going from UCVA to FTDCVA, as follows.
Let us start with the risk free closeout (C1). How can we depart as little as possible
from unilateral CVA while having condition (C1) satised? Consider equation (2.7) for
(C1), and notice that it can be rewritten in terms of unilateral CVA, in scenarios where
B < C, as
CVAB(C;B) = UCVAB(C;B) + DVAB(C;B):
This holds at time B. If we try and write the analogous equation at time t, then we
obtain the following denition of CVA, which implies that party B subtracts from its fair
value calculation the discounted value of the DVA of C that B would be liable to pay
upon defaulting, in case B defaults prior to C. We thus introduce the portable CVA as
the following process:
PCVAt(C;B) := UCVAt(C;B) +  t(C;B); 8t < B (5.1)
where
 t(C;B) := Et
h
1B<Ce
 
R B
t ruduUDVAB(C;B)
i
(5.2)
to satisfy the risk-free close-out condition in (C1). The important dierence with FTD-
CVA is that here we have a UCVA term where we do not check who defaults rst.
Under the replacement close-out, the reasoning is analogous. We start from equation
(2.9) and add and subtract UCVAB(C;B) from the right hand side. We obtain, in
scenarios where B < C,
CVAB(C;B) = UCVAB(C;B)+
 
(MB(C) + UDVAB(C;B))
+ (MB(C))
+
(1 RB(B)):
20At this point the most obvious version of this equation at time t is obtained as in (5.1)
where, this time,   is dened as
 t(C;B) = Et
h
1B<Ce
 
R B
t rudu 
(MB(C) + UDVAB(C;B))
+   (MB(C))
+
(1   RB(B))
i
:
(5.3)
Again, the important dierence with FTDCVA is that here we have a UCVA term where
we do not check who defaults rst. Similar equations apply to the case B $ C.
One can double-check that conditions (C1) and (C2) are indeed satised because, in
case C < B, we have  B(C;B) = 0 in both cases, so that
PDVAB(C;B)  PCVAB(B;C) = UCVAB(B;C)  UDVAB(C;B): (5.4)
Notice that under both (C1) and (C2) we have that  t(C;B)  0. Hence,
PCVAt(B;C)  UCVAt(B;C) (5.5)
for all t, the equality being attained only at the stopping time B.
As a ballpark estimate of order of magnitude and neglecting correlations between credit
and market risk, the dierence  t(C;B) between the portable CVA and the unilateral CVA
is equal to the product between UDVA and the probability of default in case the UDVA
and the default arrival time are uncorrelated. Due to the triangular inequality, in general
the dierence  t(C;B) is smaller than this amount. This estimate indicates that the
dierence  t(C;B) is relatively immaterial in most circumstances.
To conclude, this structuring style has the following properties:
(i) Hedgeability: The portable CVA is larger than or equal to the unilateral CVA and
it is equal to the unilateral CVA in two opposite limits: when the entity's credit-
worthiness tends to innity (i.e., in the non-defaultable limit) and when the entity
defaults. Similarly to the rst-to-default bilateral structure FTDCVA, the sensitiv-
ity with respect to the credit of the entity assessing the PCVA could have the wrong
sign for hedgeability. However, this sensitivity is quantitatively much smaller as it
derives only from the term  t(C;B), whose order of magnitude is roughly given by
the product between the DV At(C;B) and the probability to default before time t.
(ii) Numerical complexity: The exact evaluation of portable CVA is more complex than
the valuation of UCVA as it involves a nested simulation. However, approxima-
tion schemes can be devised to avoid the nested simulation and marginalise the
computational impact of moving from UCVA to PCVA.
(iii) Portability: The structure is nearly as portable as the unilateral case with replace-
ment close-out rules as the portable DVA is equal to the UDVA upon counterparty
default and the PDVA of the surviving entity against a novation counterparty does
not deviate much from the UDVA.
(iv) Induced behaviour: The portable CVA and PDVA are slightly larger than the unilat-
eral CVA and UDVA. The incentive to enter into derivative transactions as default
nears that is caused by the FTDCVA structure is absent in this case.
21(v) Macro economic impact: Similar to the standard case, just marginally better because
of the consistency from an accounting standpoint.
(vi) Bank capitalisation: Both the PCVA and the PCVA VaR capital charges are slightly
more conservative than those corresponding to the unilateral CVA. As a conse-
quence, if a bank collects PCVA from a counterparty, then it can use these funds to
fulll in full the UCVA capital adequacy obligation.
6 Collateralised transactions and margin lending
Valuation formulas in the tri-lateral and quadri-lateral cases are not ambiguous as the
ones for the uncollateralised structures above. In fact, the valuation formulas have already
been given as part of the risk neutrality conditions in Section 2.
The margin lenders A and D can procure hypothecs on qualifying collateral and place
it in segregated accounts. A would typically lend to several counterparties C and obtain
funding from various investors in tranches ranked by seniority. A tranche is characterised
by an attachment level L and a hypothec amount N. If in a (small) time interval t
the transaction covered by the hypothec suers losses in excess of L, the investor will
sustain these losses up to a maximum amount of N. In the quadri-lateral case the fair
premium (\CVA tranche spread") to which an investor of the lender A is entitled is valued
as follows:
V (A;L;N) =
E
hP
i0 e 
R Ti+1
0 rsds 
XA;[L;L+N](Ti+1)   XA;[L;L+N](Ti)
i
E
hP
i0 e 
R Ti+1
0 rsds(Ti+1   Ti)
 
N   XA;[L;L+N](Ti+1)
i ; (6.1)
where
XA;[L;L+N](t) :=

min
n X
C2A
(MC(C))
 (1   RC(C))1Ct;L + N
o
  L
+
;
0  t  T, and C 2 A denotes that the sum is over all the counterparties served by A. A
similar equation holds for B $ C and A $ D.
In the tri-lateral case where C is insured as opposed to B the formula is dierent as
it includes the DVA of B:
V (A;L;N) =
E
hP
i0 e 
R Ti+1
0 rsds 
YA;[L;L+N](Ti+1)   YA;[L;L+N](Ti)
i
E
hP
i0 e 
R Ti+1
0 rsds(Ti+1   Ti)
 
N   YA;[L;L+N](Ti+1)
i ; (6.2)
where
YA;[L;L+N](t) :=

min
n X
C2A
( MC(C)+DV AC(B;C))
+(1 RC(C))1Ct;L+N
o
 L
+
for all 0  t  T.
The comparison between the case of collateralised transactions with margin lending
and the previous uncollateralised structures reveals striking dierences. In the quadri-
lateral case we have that:
22(i) Hedgeability: One should distinguish between intra-period hedging and inter-period
hedging. On an inter-period basis, since collateralised transactions reset, B and C
are short their own credit. As a consequence, B and C can hedge their inter-period
volatility by buying protection on themselves. On an intra-period basis instead,
B and C are long a protection contract on themselves and this sensitivity is not
hedgeable. However, the intra-period risk can be reduced by reducing the length of
the reset period itself.
The margin lenders A and D are exposed to default risk and to gap risk. They can
hedge default risk by securitisation, while gap risk requires model driven strategies
to allocate sucient capital buers made up of hypothecs and emergency revolving
lines of credit in case a buer overshoot event occurs. In the uncollateralised case
instead, the ability to securitise is severely limited by the necessity to manage CVA
volatility.
With collateralised structuring, the market risk caused by changes in fair value
adverse to C stays with C. Also the risk originating from the volatility of the credit
spread of C stays with C. The same can be said about B. Only the default risk for
B and C are transferred to the margin lenders A and D.
In a scenario where B is the structuring bank, B is left with replication risk and
the risk on its own spread volatility. The two sources of risk are quite separate and
can be hedged individually. As we discuss in the next section, the spread volatility
risk suered by B in the course of dynamic replication can actually be eliminated
in a penta-lateral structure whereby the replication portfolio is cleared within the
same netting set of the replication target. In the case of uncollateralised structures
instead, CVA hedging is best performed within the trading book, a task which is
very complex, delicate and error prone.
(ii) Numerical complexity: Securitisation requires the joint simulation of credit and
market factors and the calculation of cumulative loss distributions. This task is just
marginally more complex than the calculation of rst-loss FTDCVA.
(iii) Portability: collateralised contracts are portable by construction.
(iv) Induced behaviour: Since B and C are short their own credit, if their credit improves
they are rewarded with lower insurance payments while if their credit degrades they
are subject to higher insurance payments. In particular, in case their credit degrades
or there is an adverse move in the fair value of the transaction, they have an incentive
to unwind or otherwise reduce their exposure. This behaviour mitigates systemic
risk.
(v) Macro economic impact: As compared to the uncollateralised structures considered
above, the collateralised ones avoid entirely the transfer of wealth from the equity
holders of successful companies to the debt holders of defaulted companies, thus
rewarding successful rms.
(vi) Bank capitalisation: The CVA and CVA VaR charges are avoided entirely because
the credit based derivative exposures have been replaced by asset based hypothecs.
Banks do not need to provision CVA capital and do not need to hedge the CVA
23and DVA. Bank capital requirements are reduced but their counterparty risk is also
massively reduced. Systemic risk would only resurface in case of a breakdown in the
margin lending market infrastructure, a situation that liquidity provision facilities
could be arranged to prevent.
In the tri-lateral case, the same remarks apply but with the following few exceptions
and dierences:
(i) Hedgeability: B still has a long term DVA term that entails an unhedgeable credit
exposure to the spread of B itself.
(ii) Numerical complexity: The same considerations in the quadri-lateral case apply here
also.
(iii) Portability: If C defaults, the contract is portable from B's standpoint. If B defaults,
the contract is still portable as the DVA on the balance sheet of C is short term
and it is against the margin lender A, not B.
(iv) Induced behaviour: B would behave as in the case of unilateral CVA while C would
behave as in the case of quadri-lateral margin lending.
(v) Macro economic impact: If the derivative exposures of buy-side rms were fully col-
lateralised by tri-lateral margin lending agreements, there would still be no transfer
of wealth from the equity holders of successful companies to the bond holders of
defaulted ones. There would however be a transfer of wealth from successful banks
to defaulted ones.
(vi) Bank capitalisation: The same considerations in the quadri-lateral case apply here
also.
7 Derivative replication by defaultable counterpar-
ties
An initial analysis of the problem of replication of derivative transactions under collater-
alisation but without default risk and in a purely classical Black and Scholes framework
has recently been considered in Piterbarg (2010). The fundamental impact of collateral-
isation on default risk and on CVA and DVA has been instead analysed in the already
cited Brigo et al. (2011) and Brigo et al. (2011). These works look at CVA and DVA
gap risk under several collateralisation strategies, with or without re-hypothecation, as
a function of the margining frequency, with wrong way risk and with possible instanta-
neous contagion. Minimum thresholds amounts and minimum transfer amounts are also
considered. The fundamental funding implications in presence of default risk have been
considered in Morini and Prampolini (2011), see also Castagna (2011).
In this section, we address this question from the angle adopted in this paper, i.e., we
analyse transactions at the structuring level, resolve the defaultability features by express-
ing them as embedded options and ultimately make use of the Fundamental Theorem of
Finance. The Fundamental Theorem does not assume replicability but makes only the
24much weaker hypothesis of absence of arbitrage. However, in the particular case where
replication is possible, the valuation does coincide with the cost of replication.
Let's consider a derivative transaction for which, in case it is struck between two
non-defaultable entities, there exists a perfect replication strategy for it. Having made
this hypothesis, we then suppose that the same transaction is actually struck between two
entities which can possibly default, a bank B and a client C, and we ask the question: can
the counterparty risk agreement be structured in such a way that the bank has available
a strategy of perfect replication up to the stopping time of rst default? If so, what is
the cost of replication?
If the counterparty credit risk structure is inconsistent as in the three cases in Section
3, then there are multiple prices for the same payo and the Fundamental Theorem does
not apply. Inconsistent structures are a non-starter as the possibility of replication itself
is an ill posed question.
In the remaining 6 structures discussed above, a fairly priced derivative transaction
between defaultable entities is replicated by a portfolio of transactions between non-
defaultable entities. The portfolio includes mutual default protection contracts whose
valuation is given by the CVA and DVA. Notice that from this viewpoint, the CVA and
DVA are not empirical adjustments which invalidate the Fundamental Theorem and thus
require an entirely new theoretical framework for Finance not based on the principle of
arbitrage freedom. From the viewpoint we have adopted, the Fundamental Theorem still
applies also to the defaultable case, just as long as the CVA and DVA are interpreted
themselves as the fair value of nancial contracts. Hence, replication is possible if and
only if the entire portfolio including the risk-free transactions and the CVA and DVA
protection contracts can be replicated by the defaultable entities.
A necessary condition for replication is that the portfolio containing the risk-free
transaction and the CVA and DVA terms for the structurer B can be replicated at least in
principle by a non-defaultable entity. This condition is necessary but not sucient since
a defaultable entity has at its disposal a reduced set of replication strategies as compared
to non-defaultable entities. Particularly limiting is the fact that, if B is defaultable, then
B cannot sell credit protection on itself.
The impossibility for an entity to sell protection on itself is a fundamental obstruction
to replicability that applies in particular to the bilateral rst-to-default CVA structure in
Section 4 and the portable CVA structure in Section 5. In this case, due to the wrong
sign of the dependency of both the CVA and the DVA on the credit of the structurer, the
combined CVA-DVA term cannot be replicated by a defaultable structurer.
Similar considerations apply to the tri-lateral structure in Section 6, where the struc-
turer B is also aected by a DVA term he himself cannot hedge.
The quadri-lateral structure in Section 6 does not have an issue with DVA unhedge-
ability. However, unless the replication target and the hedging instruments are covered
under a single overarching netting agreement, collateral posting obligations do not net
and give rise to non-zero carry costs to a defaultable replicating entity.
To resolve the netting issue, the structure we can envisage that is most appropriate for
replication purposes is a penta-lateral variation to the quadri-lateral structure. See Figure
2 for an illustration. In the penta-lateral case, the CCP is a central counterparty and B is
a structuring bank that engages in the replication of an exotic derivative custom designed
for a particular client C. In case a dynamic replication strategy for the given transaction
25between non-defaultable entities exists, then the same strategy is also available to B at
the condition that B clears through the same CCP both the exotic derivative transaction
and the replicating portfolio. In this case, the net value to B of the exotic derivative and
corresponding hedges is zero and so is the DVA and the collateral funding cost.
Notice that:
 B can replicate dynamically only up to the time of its default or the maturity date
of the transaction,
 the replication cost to B is precisely equal to the risk-free value of the transaction,
even if B is defaultable and its cost of funding has a non-vanishing spread,
 if counterparty C chooses not to replicate with positions within the same netting
set, it has a non-vanishing carry cost for the derivative replication strategy due to
collateral posting obligations.
In case there are hedge slippages, then B may possibly need to post collateral and
sustain the corresponding cost of carry. Furthermore, a CVA and DVA term will emerge
on the balance sheet of B. The combination of these three eects results in net costs that
B needs to transfer to the client ex-ante and price it as part of the structuring fee. Once
received, this portion of fee needs to be set aside and provisioned as a risk reserve without
being reected in the fair valuation of the transaction.
8 The case of nite liquidity
There are two situations that would lead to losses over and above the open mark to
market value at time of default: the case where the fair value process has a jump at time
of default and the case whereby at least some of the derivative transactions in a netting
set are not liquid and there is an extended close-out period to novate transactions over
which the fair value may change. In both cases, if C's defaults prior to B the transaction
may be novated or unwound by B at time C not at the fair value Mt(B) but at the higher
level Mt(B) + LC(B) where LC(B)  0 is a random variable giving the price correction
deriving from the novation process.
Under a risk-free close-out rule, if MC(B) > 0, B recovers the amount (1 RC)MC(B),
while if MC(B) < 0 then B pays this amount to C. Either way, novation costs are non-
negative, i.e., LC(B)  0. Also, under a replacement close-out, the novation cost is the
same.
In the case of bilateral transactions, the close-out rules are modied as follows in the
presence of liquidity corrections:
(C0
1) Risk-free close-out rule: If B < C, then
VB(C) =  (MB(C))
  + RB(B)(MB(C))
+   LB(C): (8.1)
Here, VB(C) is interpreted as the value to C of the transaction at the time when B
defaults. Equivalently, we can recast these equations as follows:
CVAB(C;B) = (1   RB(B))(MB(C))
+ + DVAB(C;B) + LB(C): (8.2)
Similar conditions with B $ C also hold. Equivalence of the two formulas is ob-
tained by
26(C0
2) Replacement close-out rule: If B < C, then
VB(C) =  (MB(C) + DVAB(C;B))
  + RB(B)(MB(C) + DVAB(C;B))
+   LB(C):
(8.3)
Equivalently, we have that
CVAB(C;B) = (1   RB(B))(MB(C) + DVAB(C;B))
+ + LB(C): (8.4)
Similar conditions with B $ C also hold.
In multi-lateral structures with margin lending, liquidation costs would typically be
partially borne by the margin lender up to a pre-assigned haircut level HC(B), and
partly by either the novating party B or the CCP that is responsible for losses in excess
of MC(B) + HC(B). Losses in excess of the haircut engender a CVA and DVA term
which tends to zero as the haircut level tends to innity. To keep things simple, in the
following formulas we assume that HC(B) = 1 and pretend the margin lender absorbs
all the losses. Under this simplifying assumption, we have that:
(A0
2) Secured quadri-lateral transactions with high frequency resets:
Et[Vt(A) + 1t<C<t+t(1   RC(C))(MC(C)
  + LC(C)) + C(A;C)] = 0
(8.5)
and (A;C) $ (D;B), for all t < B ^ C;
(A0
4) Secured quadri-lateral transactions with periodic resets: For all t 2 [Ti;Ti+1], the
CVA satises the equation
CVAt(A;C) = Et[e
 
R C
t rsds1C<B1C<Ti+1(1   RC(C))(MC(C)
  + LC(C))]
(8.6)
and (A;C) $ (D;B). Premia are still computed so that
Ti(A;C) = CVATi(A;C) (8.7)
and (A;C) $ (D;B).
Having made these modications in the close-out conditions, the corrected CVA and
DVA which account for liquidity gaps are dened accordingly as discounted martingales
consistently with the applicable stopping time conditions, i.e., either (8.2), or (8.4) or
(8.6).
As an example of how liquidity considerations may impact valuation, consider the case
of two treasury bonds which, after a given valuation date entail precisely identical future
cash ows. Suppose also that one of the two bonds is on-the-run and highly liquid while
the other bond is o-the-run and illiquid. Suppose that B and C exchange a repurchase
agreement on a long-short combination in these two bonds, i.e., B has the obligation
to repurchase the on-the-run bond from C while C has the obligation to repurchase the
o-the-run bond from B.
27The framework in this paper allows one to determine the fair value of the transaction
to either B or C in accordance with the Fundamental Theorem of Finance, i.e., in an
arbitrage free fashion. To do so, one needs to account for the cost of carry of transactions
of nite liquidity. More specically, when valueing a transaction one should also specify
the time horizon over which the transaction will be held and add the expected carry cost.
In case C wishes to value a strategy whereby the transaction is held until maturity or
until either B or C default, the net cost is
Et
Z B^C
t
Es

1s<C<s+ds
 
(1   RC(C))LC(B;C)

: (8.8)
Hence, the strategy to holding a direct REPO in an o-the-run bond and an inverse
REPO in an equivalent on-the-run bond has a positive arbitrage free cost to C. The total
expected cost to C is zero if one includes the putative gain that C would make in case
of its own default. The opposite strategy has a zero cost to B assuming that C posts
collateral in full through a margin lender. The strategy of the margin lender has zero fair
value at equilibrium.
9 Bank funding strategies
Segregated collateral cannot directly be used as a source of funding for the bank. If
re-hypothecation was allowed, then the investors would inherit bank credit risk. This is
inecient from the clearing standpoint as CCPs require variation margin to be posted
in cash. It is also inecient from the point of view of the bank that would favour fully
fungible cash collateral that can be re-hypothecated.
Both problems can be solved by using segregated collateral to secure overnight cash
REPO agreement of a slightly new kind. See Fig. 4 for an illustration. The upgrade
strategy involves re-writing the CSA agreement between B and C in such a way the
counterparty C posts segregated collateral to cover both initial and variation margin on
a netting set of OTC transactions with bank B. Furthermore, C writes a `transferable
novation guarantee' to B stating that upon the default of B, the counterparty C is obliged
to settle the variation margin to B in cash.
The margin lender A takes up the commitment to post initial and variation margin on
behalf of C in segregated form by handing over a hypothec to C which then C transfers
over to bank B. The hypothec references assets in a pool which are liquidated upon
default of C. The margin lender does not take any bank risk. Upon default of B, the
margin lender A still makes available the hypothecs to C so that C can transfer them
over to another bank during the novation process. The only instance when A liquidates
assets is when C defaults.
The liquidity provider L is asked to provide overnight funding to bank B in an amount
equal to the variation margin posted by C on any given day. B pays to L funding costs
appropriate for a fully secured line of credit (i.e., a line of credit not subject to bank
credit risk).
The overnight funding line by L is secured by two layers of protection: the novation
guarantee written by the counterparty C and the hypothecs written by the margin lender
A. To explain why the revolver is fully secured, one needs to analyse various scenarios.
28 In case neither the counterparty C nor the bank B default prior to the termination
of the margin lending contract, then the cash line is renewed overnight every day
until maturity.
 In case the counterparty C defaults prior to maturity and prior to bank B, then
the margin lender liquidates assets in the investors' pool in an amount equal to the
variation margin and pays L in full. In addition, the margin lender A liquidates
assets in the pool up to a maximum amount equal to the initial margin in order to
cover for gap risk and make B whole.
 In case the bank B defaults prior to maturity and not after the counterparty C, then
the novation guarantee written by C and held by the liquidity provider L, entitles
L to demand payment of the variation margin in full from counterparty C. At this
point there are two sub-cases:
{ In case C pays the variation margin in cash as required, then the overnight
cash line by L is closed with no loss to L and the investors in the margin lender
A don't suer losses.
{ In case C fails to pay the variation margin, then the lender L raises a failure
to pay condition on C and counterparty C defaults. Since default of C is a
materiality condition for the margin lender A and L holds the hypothec, A
liquidates assets in the investors' pool in amounts sucient to cover for the
variation margin and closes the revolver without losses to the lender L.
There are issues about timing that should be carefully accounted for. For instance,
upon the default of B, the overnight lender L may need to grant a grace period to C in
order to be refunded of the variation margin in full. In case of bank default, one should
also ensure that the margin lending protection is extended beyond the date at which L
may potentially have to ask to liquidate the segregated collateral. This is just an example
of a subtlety due to timings, but we think this sort of mechanics can be nailed down
with some work. It is important to notice that the availability of cash collateral allows
facilitates clearing at CCPs. In turn, CCP clearing facilitates the novation process and
streamlines the recovery of the overnight cash line by the liquidity provider and decreases
the probability that a bank default could trigger a counterparty default.
In conclusion, a bank can benet from having segregated collateral posted to cover
variation margin for funding purposes. The presence of these assets would allow the bank
access to low cost cash funding at fully secured rates, i.e., rates that are indierent to the
bank's own credit spread and unsecured funding costs.
10 Conclusions
We have reviewed 10 dierent structuring styles for counterparty credit risk sensitive
transactions. In our analysis, we reduce to the Fundamental Theorem of Finance by
interpreting the CVA and DVA terms as prices of embedded contractual obligations con-
tingent to the event of default. As such, the various dierent denitions of CVA and DVA
are precisely identied as corresponding to dierent contractual structures.
29Figure 4: Upgrade scheme of segregated collateral into overnight cash.
In the past two decades, nancial markets witnessed the implementation of three
separate standards. The evolution of these standards was driven by a desire to achieve a
consistent valuation, an objective still not fully achieved in Basel III regulatory documents
and ISDA Master Agreements. The current standard is also plagued by various paradoxes
related to DVA accounting which encourages anti-economical behaviour. Moreover, these
paradoxes place an insurmountable limitation to the ability of replicating dynamically the
price process of derivative transactions, an impossibility that hampers the role of banks
as nancial intermediaries.
The rst proposal for a consistent valuation framework for CVA and DVA involves
including a rst-to-default clause in default protection contracts. This modication of the
standard however represents a substantial deviation from the unilateral CVA specication
in Basel III. To remedy in part, we introduce a new notion of portable CVA which is
consistent and also very close to unilateral CVA.
We next consider three structures based on margin lending and full collateralisation.
We conclude that the quadri-lateral structure whereby two margin lenders provide hy-
pothecs to ensure full collateralisation at all times to cover the open mark-to-market of
derivative transactions is promising. These structures do not require a bank to carry out
CVA trading as market risk and counterparty spread risk are transferred to the coun-
terparty. Pure default risk is retained by the margin lenders that can securitise it in a
straightforward fashion without being hampered by CVA volatility.
Finally, we consider the problem of dynamic replication for derivative transactions
between defaultable entities. We introduce a penta-lateral structure which is a variation
of the quadri-lateral structure above with the addition of a central counterparty. In the
penta-lateral case, we conclude that, if a replication strategy between non-defaultable
entities exists, then this strategy can be implemented also by a defaultable structurer
until its default time and the cost of replication is the risk-free fair value, independently
30of the credit quality of the structurer.
For more detailed references on consistent global valuation, on DVA accounting con-
troversies, on Basel III, on the ISDA Master agreements and closeout protocols, on Col-
lateralisation, Wrong Way Risk, Gap risk, DVA hedging, the rst-to-default clause, and
examples across asset classes we refer to the CVA FAQ Brigo (2011).
A Probabilistic Framework and Absence of Arbitrage
We denote by B and C respectively the default times of the bank and counterparty. We
x the portfolio time horizon T 2 R+, in that all default-free cash ows will be assumed to
be zero after T, and x the risk neutral pricing model (
;G;Q), with a ltration (Gt)t2R+
such that B and C are G-stopping times. Given that all cash ows go to zero after
T, we can limit ourselves to the nite stopping times minfB;Tg and minfC;Tg for all
practical purposes.
We denote by Et the conditional expectation under Q given Gt, and by Ei the condi-
tional expectation under Q given the stopped ltration Gi. We exclude the possibility of
simultaneous defaults, assuming that Q(B = C) = 0.
The pivotal theoretical result for asset valuation is the Fundamental Theorem of Fi-
nance, formulated in 1931 by Bruno de Finetti de Finetti (1931), see also Albanese and Li
(2009) for a modern account. The mathematical expression of the principle of arbitrage
freedom can be stated as a set of linear inequalities. The Fundamental Theorem indi-
cates how to nd all solutions to these equations and how to express them via transition
probabilities which can be estimated, or implied, from market prices. This framework
has been formulated under a discrete setup, and the notions of replication and hedging
strategy play no role in the related characterisation of arbitrage freedom. The evolution
of this result has been considered for example by Dalang, Morton, and Willinger (1990),
up to the most modern results on arbitrage free theory such as Delbaen and Schacher-
mayer (1994). It is debatable whether the continuous framework is really needed or adds
clarity for a realistic representation of no arbitrage conditions in actual markets, see also
Albanese and Li (2009) and Albanese, Gimonet, and White (2010) for a related discus-
sion. Nonetheless, for the mainstream purposes of this paper, we stick to the standard
continuous time version of arbitrage freedom as formulated for example in Harrison and
Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981), and specialised to the credit context in
Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002), to which we refer for more details on arbitrage freedom
under default risk.
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